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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: THE CURRENT TREND TO
LIBERALIZE ABORTION LAWS-
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
Introduction
During the last several years there has
been an increasing number of commen-
taries on the problem of abortion. Most of
these articles have called for radical changes
in the existing laws dealing with the crime
of abortion. For example, in a recent issue
of the American Bar Association Journal
a lawyer and a doctor collaborated in urg-
ing that the laws of abortion be modified to
bring them into conformity with what they
consider modern medical practice.'
Similarly, the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code presents a clear and con-
cise statement of the changes proposed by
many of those who favor a liberalization of
the present abortion laws. Under this Code
abortions would be legal if performed to
preserve the life or health of a mother, to
prevent the birth of a deformed child, or to
terminate pregnancies resulting from rape
or incest.2
1 Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure
of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52 (1964).
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1959):
"(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who pur-
posely and unjustifiably terminates the pregnancy
of another otherwise than by a live birth commits
a felony of the third degree or, where the preg-
nancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth week,
a felony of the second degree.
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is
justified in terminating a pregnancy if:
(a) he believes there is substantial risk that con-
tinuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair
the physical or mental health of the mother or
that the child would be born with grave physical
or mental defect, or the pregnancy resulted from
rape ... or from incest...
This note will analyze these recommenda-
tions and the reasons advanced in support
of them from a legal, medical, psychologi-
cal, and moral viewpoint. This analysis will
then be applied to several fact situations
and finally, using the abortion problem as
a focal point, the proper relationship of
criminal law and morality in a pluralistic
society will be discussed.
Abortion may be defined as the "expul-
sion of the fetus prematurely, particularly
at any time before it is capable of sustaining
life.'" Depending on the cause of the expul-
sion, an abortion is either spontaneous or
induced. Spontaneous abortion results from
accident or disease, while induced abortion
results "from man's intentonal interfer-
ence with the normal course of pregnancy.",
This note is limited to a discussion of in-
duced abortions.5
(b) two physicians, one of whom may be the
person performing the abortion, have certified in
writing their belief in the justifying circumstances,
and have filed such certificate prior to the abor-
tion in the licensed hospital where it is to be per-
formed, or in such other place as may be desig-
nated by law.
Justification of abortion is an affirmative defense."
This section is now § 230.3 of the Proposed Offi-
cial Draft.
• MALOY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 4
(2d ed. 1951).
4 Ibid.
5 The reader is cautioned that the statistics pre-
sented in this note have analytic limitations. The
size of the samples used to gather these figures
ranges from 65 New York City mothers to over
22,000 women from all segments and sections of
American society. Since there is a direct correla-
tion between the representativeness and size of a
sample, and the correctness of the result, the vary-
ing validity of the samples is obvious. Further-
more, most of the conclusions have been
contradicted by other statistical evidence. For
these reasons the conclusions drawn from the
largest sample have been employed wherever
possible.
Sociological Aspects
Although approximately ninety per cent
of all pre-marital pregnancies end in abor-
tion," most illegal abortions in this country
are performed on married women who al-
ready have had children.7 One study shows
that the rate of illegal abortions increases
with the number of children in a family, the
highest rate occurring among women having
three children. The overwhelming majority
of abortions takes place during the first
eight weeks of pregnancy ' and most are
performed by licensed physicians.1
Religious affiliation has a substantial
effect on the abortion rate.' The percentage
of pregnancies ending in criminal abortion
is highest among those of the Jewish faith
and lowest among Catholics, with Protes-
tants and those of other religious beliefs
somewhere in the middle.'1 Education
seems to be an important factor, while
economic class is less influential. Of the
total number of abortions performed, most
occur among women with at least some
college education.' 3 If all of society is eco-
nomically categorized, the difference in
abortion rates between the class with the
highest rate (the poor) and the class with
the lowest rate (the rich) is only one half of
C MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment at 147
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). But see GEBHARD,
POMEROY, MARTIN & CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY,
BIRTH AND ABORTION 17 (1958), where in a study
of 5,293 females it was found that 230 of 327
pre-marital pregnancies ended in illegal abortion.
7 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6.
8 WHELPTON, THE ABORTION PROBLEM 18 (1944).
9 CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
77 (1958).
1) GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 198.
" Id. at 52.
12 WILLIAMs, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND TIlE
CRIMINAL LAW 148 (1957). But see CALDERONE,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 43.
13 GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 19.
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one per cent.1 ' Finally, race seems to be of
significance, there being evidence that the
abortion rate among whites is almost three
times that among Negroes."
Each day there are over 3000 illegal
abortions performed in the United States, " ',
with over one per cent of the women oper-
ated on dying as a result.17 Therefore, as
many as ten thousand women die each year
at the hands of criminal abortionists.
The Position of the Reformers
It is this alarming number of illegal abor-
tions and the resulting mortality rate that
have motivated the suggestions for change
by various authors. Those who favor liberal-
izing the present abortion laws feel that the
high mortality rate could be reduced sub-
stantially if fewer legal sanctions stood in
the path of the mother and the doctor. It is
argued that legalization will allow physi-
cians to treat women seeking an abortion,
thus limiting the resort to "quack" doctors.'
Furthermore, many writers in this coun-
try do not consider abortion a moral prob-
lem. It is their opinion that "the principle
of freedom of conscience" is at issue," and
,14 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 207.
1" Ibid. But see CALDERONE, op. cit. stupra note 9,
at 44.
'e See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 1. See also
Mills, A Medicolegal Analysis of Abortion Stat-
utes, 31 So. CAL. L. REV. 181, 182 (1958) for an
estimate of 600,000 abortions per year.
17 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6. See TAUSSIG,
ABORTION - SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 27-28
(1936). But see Fisher, Criminal Abortion, 42
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 242, 247 (1951) for an
estimate of 0.5%.
is See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 1, where it is
stated that "restrictive laws drive large numbers
of desperate women into the hands of the very
persons from whom the law seeks to shield them,
the unskilled criminal abortionist."
1! Williams, Introduction to JENKINS, LAW FOR
THE RICH 19 (1960).
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in a free society "to use the criminal law
against a substantial body of decent opinion
•.. is contrary to our basic traditions. 2 It
is further reasoned that "the criminal law in
this area cannot undertake or pretend to
draw the line where religion or morals
would draw it." ' 21 In addressing those who
are opposed to abortion on purely moral
grounds, the reformers would state, as did
Oliver Cromwell to the Church of Scotland,
"I beseech you in the bowels of Christ,
think it possible you may be wrong. '22
Today, an abortion is legal only if per-
formed to save the life of the mother. 23 In
addition to the grounds for abortion sug-
gested in the Model Penal Code, 24 many of
those favoring a liberalization have urged
that the present prohibitory laws be relaxed
so as to include abortions performed when
the pregnancy has resulted from a statutory
rape,25 when the child would be illegiti-
mate, 21 or for other social reasons, such as
the pregnancy of a woman demonstrated to
be an unfit mother.2 7 Although some would
20 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, at 151.
21 Id. at 150.
22 Williams, op. cit. supra note 19.
23 See N. Y. PEN. LAW § 80. Forty-two states have
only this exception. Alabama, Oregon and the
District of Columbia allow abortions to preserve
the life or health of the mother. Colorado and
New Mexico accept saving the life of the mother
or preventing serious or permanent bodily injury
to her as a justification. In Maryland abortion is
allowed when a physician is convinced that no
other method will insure the safety of the mother,
or if the fetus is dead. In Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania the statute requires, for a violation,
that the abortion be done "unlawfully" while in
New Jersey it must be done "maliciously or with-
out lawful justification." Leavy & Kummer, Crim-
inal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding
Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. REv. 123, 127-28 (1962).
24 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 2.
25 CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15.
20 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, at 155.
27 Id. at 156.
favor doing away with all limitations on the
practice of abortion, 28 most advocates of
change recognize the need for some restric-
tions.29
The problems of sterilization, birth con-
trol and abortion are closely related, since
the increased use of birth control devices or
sterilization would, quite obviously, reduce
the abortion problem. Those urging a revi-
sion of the present laws, therefore, also
favor an increased use of birth control and
sterilizationA°
The Legal Aspects
Since the problem of abortion has existed
throughout history, the difficulty in resolv-
ing the present controversy is apparent. The
first known abortion law dates from 1728
B.C. Hammurabi, King of Sumer and
Akkad, in codifying the law of Babylonia,
wrote:
If a seignior struck a(nother) seignior's
daughter and has caused her to have a mis-
carriage, he shall pay ten shekels of silver
for her fetus.
If that woman has died, they shall put his
daughter to death.2 '
Although most of the laws of primitive
and very early societies were based on moral
28 Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure
of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52, 55 (1964).
29 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, at 150. "[I]f
all legal restraint on abortion were removed ... it
is possible that the absolute number of abortions
might so increase that. .. a larger number of
deaths would have to be anticipated." Ibid.
;10 See Mills, supra note 16, at 196 n.88.
:31 PRITCHARD, THE HITTITE LAWS 175 (2d ed.
1955). The Assyrians had an abortion statute
which dates from the twelfth century B.C. There is
evidence that the Hittites and the ancient Egyp-
tians had these restrictive laws. The Old Testa-
ment warns against abortion, as did the ancient
laws of Buddha. Quay, Justifiable Abortion-
Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 395,
403 (1961).
considerations, many abortion laws were
used as a tool to control the periodic rises
and falls of the society's population. 3
2
Plato approved of abortions as an alter-
native to the more barbaric practice of in-
fanticide, 33 and Aristotle recommended
abortion to the Spartans as a eugenic meas-
ure.34 In early Roman law abortion was
considered an offense against the parents,
and was therefore justified if done with the
approval of the parents.33 After the Punic
Wars and with the decline of the Roman
Republic abortion became more common-
place.3 6
Following the establishment of the Cath-
olic Church, the reasons for prohibiting
abortion became largely moral in nature.
3 7
The laws against abortion were based on a
belief in the concept of a "soul." An abor-
tion committed before there was a soul in
the embryonic body was punishable as an
act preventing a life coming into being. To
destroy the fetus after the infusion of a soul
was considered murder .' This theory, based
on the writings of St. Augustine, was gener-
ally accepted by theologians. St. Thomas
added that life is manifested by two actions,
knowledge and movement.' 9 Bracton, a con-
temporary of Aquinas, understood "move-
ment" to mean "quickening," i.e., the time
"WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 12.
1 WESTERMARCK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 415 (2d ed. 1952).
34 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1I, ix.
-" Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2
MODERN L. REV. 126, 131 (1938).
'0 Quay, supra note 31, at 410.
I APOSTOLIC FATHERS 312 (Loeb ed. 1912).
Didache, the earliest Christian writing now
known outside of the canonical books, states that
"thou shalt not procure abortion, nor commit
infanticide ... " DIDACHE (anon.), II, 1-2.
a8 See WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 150 (1957).
39 Id. at 151.
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at which the mother first feels fetal move-
ment, and incorporated this concept into his
writings. 40 Hence the basis of the common-
law rule is that unless it is absolutely neces-
sary to save the life of the mother, abortion
of a quickened fetus is prohibited.4 1 By the
early nineteenth century, England and most
jurisdictions in the United States had passed
statutes dealing with abortion. 4 2 Under the
British rule it was a crime to abort a fetus
whether or not it had quickened, and most
of the states of the United States adopted a
similar rule.
The legal problems presented in interpret-
ing and applying the present statutes involve
five main areas: (1) the stage of pregnancy
at which the act is performed; (2) the ele-
ments of the criminal act; (3) the scope of
the therapeutic exception; (4) the requisite
state of mind of the abortionist; and (5) the
burden of proof.
The stage of pregnancy at which the act
is performed is determinative of the extent
of criminal liability in several states. 43 The
usual test is "quickening." This is generally
a poor criterion, however, because it is
purely subjective and depends in large part
on the sensitivity of a mother to the activity
of the fetus. Furthermore, if the mother has
died as a result of the operation, there is no
way of proving the fact of "quickening."
In most states the crime is not the abor-
tion itself, but merely the attempt to abort,
since the danger to the mother arises from
the attempt, be it successful or not.4 4 In fact,
4 Ibid.
41 CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 394 (5th ed.
1952).
42 See 43 George 3 c.58 (1803); Quay, supra
note 31, at 447-520.
43 See MIss. CODE ANN. § 2222 (1956).
44 Mills, A Medicolegal Analysis of Abortion
Statutes, 31 So. CAL. L. REV. 181, 191 (1958).
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some states impose criminal liability even
though the woman was not pregnant.4 5 Even
in cases where a fetus is dead, it has been
held to be criminal to attempt to, or, in fact,
remove it.4" The reason for so holding is to
deprive the abortionist of the defense, which
is difficult to rebut, that the fetus was already
dead.
The scope of the therapeutic exception is
the center of the present controversy. Loui-
siana seems to be the only state which pro-
hibits all abortions.4 7 Maryland, on the
other hand, probably has the most liberal
abortion law in this country. Its statute
allows abortions by a licensed physician
when, after consultation with another prac-
titioner, he is satisfied that there is no other
method to secure the safety of the mother.
48
The leading case in interpreting the rec-
ognized exception to the rule prohibiting
abortions is The King v. Bourne."' The facts
in this case are particularly significant. The
statute under which the defendant was being
prosecuted allowed abortions only to save
the life of the mother. In this case, a well-
known British physician performed an abor-
tion on a fourteen year old girl who had
been raped and was pregnant as a result.
The doctor, who had brazenly invited pros-
ecution, was tried and acquitted. The ac-
quittal was based on the theory that the
girl's mental health would be jeopardized if
she were required to bear the rapist's child.
The result in this case raises the question
of whether the therapeutic exception fully
45 Ibid. See also WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 38,
at 153.
46 Territory v. Young, 37 Hawaii 150 (1945);
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58
S.E.2d 72 (1950); State v. Cox, 197 Wash. 67, 84
P.2d 357 (1938).
47 LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87 (1951).
4s MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957).
19 [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
encompasses psychological threats to life.
In the United States the answer is probably
in the negative. It has been argued that the
threat of suicide by the woman will be ac-
cepted as a justification,5" but no cases have
been found sustaining this point. State v.
Dunklebarger51 lends some support to this
argument but may be distinguished on the
evidence that the fetus was already dead at
the time of the abortion. The case involved
a very emotional fifteen year old pregnant
girl who had threatened to kill herself and
had jumped several times from a height of
eight to ten feet. The court held that the
evidence was insufficient to convict the
doctor.
Other problems in delineating the scope
of the therapeutic exception are: (1)
whether the exception should extend to
other than licensed physicians;5 2  (2)
whether consultation with a fixed number of
specialists should be required; 53 and (3)
whether the operation should be limited to
licensed hospitals.5 4
It must be remembered that the argu-
ments for liberalizing the scope of the thera-
peutic exception are basically philosophical.
One authority has unequivocally stated that
"serious physical injury to the mother ... is
an evil greater both morally and socially
than the destruction of the fetus." 55
Is the surgeon's subjective belief in the
50 See McGraw, Legal Aspects of Termination of
Pregnancy on Psychiatric Grounds, 56 N.Y.S.J.
MEDICINE 1605, 1607 (1956). But see Hatchard v.
State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N.W. 380 (1891).
51 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928).
2 Only four states require the operation to be
performed by physicians. Mills, supra note 44, at
190.
5 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
5A Ibid.
55 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 163-64.
necessity of the operation, if it conforms
with medical knowledge, a sufficient de-
fense, or is the necessity of an abortion an
objective question of fact for the jury? The
authorities are diametrically opposed in
their answers to this question.5 6
A somewhat different problem arises
when the physician does not know or even
care if the operation is necessary; but after
he has performed the abortion he discovers
it was necessary to save the mother's life. In
other words, he had the mens rea, but he has
not committed the actus rea. The tenor of
the cases indicates that there is a conflict
of authority as to the criminal, nature of
such an operation.-7  One authority has
stated that "there is no reason why such a
surgeon should not be convicted of attempt-
ing a criminal abortion. 55
In most of the United States and in Eng-
land the lack of necessity for the abortion
must be proven by the prosecution."9 But in
a minority of the states, including New
York, there is a presumption that the abor-
tion was unnecessary.60 Even in those states
which place the burden on the prosecution,
proof that the woman was previously in
good health is sufficient to shift the burden
of coming forward with the evidence to the
physician.6 1
56Compare Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315
Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944), with Adams v.
State, 88 A.2d 556 (Md. 1952).
57 Compare Commonwealth v. Wheeler, supra
note 56, with Hatchard v. State, supra note 50.
5s WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 179.
59 See, e.g., State v. Fitzgerald, 174 S.W.2d 211
(Mo. 1943); State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52
A.2d 513 (1947).
60 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 181. Except
for the Michigan statute which expressly removes
the burden from the prosecution, there is no "rele-
vant difference" of wording of the statutes. Id.
at n.3.
6 Id. at 182.
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Placing the evidentiary burden on the de-
fense would be no embarrassment to the
bona fide practitioner, because all he has to
do to satisfy the burden of raising the issue
is to give evidence of the reason why he
thought the operation necessary. Once he
has done this, the jury will be directed that
the persuasive burden of proof rests upon
the prosecution. 62
Other legal problems related to abortion
have received widespread comment. The
first is the liability of the mother in her own
right or as an accomplice. 63 Although there
is a division of opinion as to the guilt of the
mother who attempts to, or does actually,
abort herself, the "majority view in the
United States is that the woman-abortee is
not an accomplice to the offense, but a vic-
tim of it."" Secondly, the enforceability of
the abortion laws has been questioned. The
assenting mother is seldom, if ever, prose-
cuted, the theory being that prosecution will
not have a deterrent effect on her,65 and that
the testimony of the mother is necessary to
build a case against the abortionist.6 6 The
frequent occurrence of adverse physical
effects after an abortion necessitates that she
should not be so frightened by the law so
as to fear competent hospital care.6 7 As one
62 Id. at 183. Contra, Mills, supra note 44, at 198.
"Regardless of the scope of the exception, the
burden of proof on the issue of necessity for thera-
peutic abortion should be on the prosecution. ...
Ibid.
63 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 156. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment at 157-59
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
64 Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Fail-
ure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52, 53 (1964). See
People v. McGonegal, 136 N.Y. 62, 75-76, 32
N.E. 616, 620-21 (1892).
65 WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 154 (1957).
Go Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human
Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L.
REV. 123, 126 (1962).
67 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 65, at 154.
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authority has said:
perhaps the most decisive reason for the
indulgence is an unavowed change of atti-
tude towards the crime of abortion. The
chief evil of an abortion is no longer
thought to be the loss of the unborn child,
but the injury done to the mother by the
unskilled abortionist. 68
Prosecutions of licensed physicians are as
rare as prosecutions of mothers. In fact,
there are no known prosecutions of licensed
medical practitioners who, prior to termi-
nating pregnancy, obtained concurring
medical opinions as to the necessity of
therapeutic abortion and/or permission
from hospital boards. 69
While very recent statistics on the actual
number of annual convictions for abortion
in the United States are unavailable, the
older statistics indicate that there are less
than 2500.70 Based on these facts it may not
be incorrect to say that there is "no other
instance in history in which there has been
such frank and universal disregard for a
criminal law." 71
The Medical Aspects
It is the opinion of those who favor a
liberalization of the current laws on abor-
tion that both law and morality are at odds
with current medical practice.7 1 In order to
test the validity of this assertion, it is neces-
sary to examine modem medicine's attitude
towards abortion.
A brief history will aid in understanding
68 Ibid.
69 Leavy & Kummer, supra note 66, at 128.
70 Fisher, Criminal Abortion, 42 J. CRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 242, 244 (1951).
71 TAUssIG, ABORTION-SPONTANEOUS AND IN-
DUCED 422 (1936). But see WILLIAMS, op. cit.
supra note 65, at 168. "There can be little doubt
that fear of the law is a determining factor in the
policy adopted by hospitals and surgeons, both
in the United States and Great Britain." Ibid.
72 See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 64, at 52-53.
the significance of the current practice of
physicians. Although it is stated in the Hyp-
pocratic Oath, "I will not give to a woman
a pessary to produce abortion," Hippocrates
is said to have suggested to an entertainer,
who was burdened with an unwanted preg-
nancy, that she should jump into the air
seven times so that her heels touch her but-
tocks. 2 The Hyppocratic Oath is taken by
all licensed practitioners, and yet many
doctors, as did Hippocrates, accept abortion
as a proper medical practice.
Today, doctors are in sharp disagree-
ment as to whether abortion is medically
justified. One representative opinion would
list rheumatic heart disease with a history
of previous decompensation, advanced hy-
pertensive vascular disease and carcinoma
of the cervix as justifications for abortion."
It has been argued, on the other hand, that
"anyone who performs a therapeutic abor-
tion is either ignorant of modern medical
methods of treating the complications of
pregnancy or is unwilling to take the time to
use them."75
It is the opinion of many experts that if
abortion had not been prohibited, medical
progress in treating the innumerable compli-
cations of pregnancy would have been at a
snail's pace.76 Without as yet commenting on
the morality of the abortion operation, it is
not unreasonable to suggest that the
72 This incident is recorded in Leavy & Kummer,
supra note 66, at 125.
74 WILLIAMS, OBSTETRICS 1077 (11 th ed. Eastman
1956).
75 Heffernan & Lynch, Is Therapeutic Abortion
Scientifically Justified?, 19 LINACRE Q. 24 (1952).
76 See, e.g., Mills, A Medicolegal Analysis of
Abortion Statutes, 31 So. CAL. L. REV. 181,
195-96 (1958); Quay, Justifiable Abortion -
Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 173,
233 (1960).
exemptions to liability under the heading of
therapeutic necessity should be reappraised
by both the medical and legal professions;
but no substantive changes should be made
until the medical profession can and does
present a unity of opinion by a significant
number of its members.72
Psychological Aspects
As the medical reasons for abortion have
diminished, there has been a marked in-
crease in the number of abortions performed
for psychological reasons. Figures derived
from New York City's requirement that
fetal deaths be registered show that during
the early 1940's the percentage of abortions
for psychological reasons increased from 8.2
per cent to 40 per cent."'
The psychological justifications are more
difficult to support scientifically than the
medical. This is due largely to the recent
emergence of psychology as a separate dis-
cipline. Also, there is no clear line between
"illness" and concern about social pressures.
For instance, is it fear of disgrace or a men-
tal aberration which prompts the unwed
mother to threaten suicide if her pregnancy
is not terminated?
A further complication in this area is the
conflicting evidence as to the possible ad-
verse after-effects of an abortion. It has been
estimated that 9 per cent of the women who
undergo abortions suffer unfavorable psy-
17 Mills, supra note 76, at 198. But see Leavy &
Kummer, supra note 64, at 52, where it is argued:
"airing these problems is a prerequisite to any
attempt at solution. But we consider changing the
law.. .to bring it into conformity with responsible
medical attitudes... to be the significant primary
step...."
78Tietze, Therapeutic Abortions in New York
City, 1943-47, 60 AM. J. OBS. & GYN. 146 (1950).
See CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
79 (1958), where the percentage of abortions for
psychological reasons is set at 37.8%.
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chological consequences. 9  In addition,
abortion may "exert a deleterious effect that
is more harmful than the continuation of
pregnancy" to a mentally ill woman. 0 Al-
though there is recent evidence tending to
cast doubt on the frequent occurrence of
adverse psychological effects,"' the unfavor-
able physical consequences which do occur
in over 14 per cent of the cases 2 must raise
a question as to the therapeutic value of
abortion.
Liberalization Experiments Outside
The United States
Most countries have laws which regulate
abortion in some manner.8 3 The main pur-
pose in studying foreign solutions to the
abortion problem is to learn what can be ex-
pected if the American laws are liberalized
so as to allow abortion on eugenic and what
are called humanitarian grounds. For pres-
ent purposes, the discussion will be limited
to the experiences of Japan, Sweden and
Denmark. In Japan, where the population
is close to 90 million, there was a 30 per
cent drop in the national birth rate in the
first 6 years after full legalization of abor-
tion. 4 In 1949, one year after this legaliza-
tion, there were 101,601 abortions; by
1955, this number had risen to 1,170,143
and it is estimated that there are almost as
many unreported abortions.8 5 Since that
79 GEBHARD. POMEROY, MARTIN & CHRISTENSON,
PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION 205 (1958).
80 Arbuse & Schedtman, Neuropsychiatric Indica-
tions for Therapeutic Abortion, 1 AM. PRACT.
1069 (1950).
81 See Kummer, Post-Abortion Psychiatric Illness
-A Myth?, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 980 (1963).
82 GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 79.
83 See generally id. at 215-47 for information on
more than twenty countries.
84 Leavy & Kummer, supra note 66, at 137 n.99.
85 GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 79, at 219.
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time the number has decreased slightly but
this leveling off is the result of a sharp rise
in sterilization and an increased use of con-
traceptives.,
The situation in Sweden is best under-
stood if it is remembered that Sweden is
probably the least repressive of all Western
countries in its attitudes towards sexual
behavior. Over 80 per cent of the females
and 90 per cent of the males have had pre-
marital intercourse, and approximately 10
per cent of the total births occur out of
wedlock.8 7 In 1940 for every 200 live births
there was one abortion, but in 1955 this
number had increased to over 9.8 It is esti-
mated that 38 per cent of the women apply
for and are allowed even a second abortion.
Generally, during or immediately after this
second operation the women are sterilized.
Although the abortion mortality rate has
decreased substantially, when both sterili-
zation and abortion take place at the same
time the death rate is approximately one per
cent, or the same as in the United States for
illegal abortions.,9 A study of the psycho-
logical after-effects of the operation showed
that approximately 50 per cent of those who
had abortions were satisfied and grateful,
while about 11 per cent suffered impaired
mental health.9 The result in Sweden seems
86 In 1959, over 40,000 people were sterilized,
and it is estimated that over 40% of the popula-
tion regularly uses contraceptives. The Japanese
government has played a major part in this area
in an attempt to control the population. This effort
has included clinics, demonstrations and dissemi-
nation of literature on these subjects. For further
information on the Japanese experience, see gen-
erally ASIA FAMILY PLANNING AsS'N, FAMILY
PLANNING IN JAPAN (1961).
87 GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 79, at 223.
88 CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 78, at 28.
89 GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 79, at 223.
90 CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 78, at 133-34.
to have been an increase in the total number
of abortions, rather than a decrease in the
number of illegal abortions. 91
In Denmark abortions have been legal
since 1939. Since that date the number of
legal abortions has increased tenfold and
"the number of criminal abortions, instead
of approaching zero has increased to 9,000
a year. "92 Today, approximately 17 per cent
of all pregnancies end in abortion whether
legal or illegal.93 In each of these countries,
although there has been a sharp decrease in
the mortality rate, the total number of legal
abortions, and more significantly the num-
ber of illegal abortions, has increased since
abortion was legalized. It appears that a
more liberal statute may increase the busi-
ness of the "quack" doctors who perform
illegal abortions, instead of reducing it, as
has been argued by those who would reform
the law in this country.9 4
The Catholic Attitude Toward Abortion
The Catholic Church has always con-
sidered voluntarily induced abortion a crime
9 1 WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIM-
INAL LAW 242 (1957). An analysis of 200 requests
for legal abortions is illuminating. Sixty women
were persuaded to continue the pregnancy. Per-
mission to have an abortion was given to 97
women. Of these, 13 women did not have an
abortion: 10 changed their minds; 2 had spon-
taneous abortions; and one woman came for the
abortion after the legal term. Thirty-one were
refused permission: 27 continued the pregnancy;
2 had illegal abortions performed; one went to
another agency and received permission; and one
had a spontaneous abortion. Before a decision
was made on their requests, 7 women had spon-
taneous abortions and 5 women had illegal abor-
tions. CALDERONE, Op. cit. supra note 78, at
133-34.
92 Quay, supra note 76, at 439.
93 CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 78, at 21.
94 See Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A
Failure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52 (1964).
and a serious sin. Her earliest laws rein-
forced this condemnation with severe canon-
ical penalties.0 5 These laws and the present
laws are based on a belief that man has an
inalienable God-given right to life. 6
Aristotle believed that every living being
had a soul. He theorized that a human soul
was not infused into the embryo until it was
sufficiently developed to receive it. Since the
embryo had to pass through a vegetable and
an animal stage before it received a human
soul, he designated this pre-human being a
foetus inanimatus. Upon the infusion of a
human soul, the embryo was considered -a
foetus animatus, i.e., a human being. 9 In
1211 Pope Innocent III introduced this dis-
tinction into the Canon law. 8 In 1917 the
Code of Canon Law was promulgated by
Pope Benedict XV. The Canons provide
that "all who effectively procure abortion,
the mother included, incur excommunica-
tion . .."" The Canons further elaborate
that "all who ... effectively procure abor-
tion of a human foetus, and all who co-
operate thereto incur criminal irregular-
ity."' 0 Although it is sinful even to attempt
an abortion, unless it is successful no canon-
ical penalties are incurred.10'
Some authorities are of the opinion that
the "insertion of the phrase 'human fetus'...
[is] a definite indication of the legislator's
95 BONNAR, THE CATHOLIC DOCTOR 82 (5th ed.
1950). At the Council of Ancyra in 314 A.D.
these penalties were mitigated. Ibid.
96 Tiberghien, Principles And Moral Conscience,
in FLOOD, NEW PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
147 (1952).
97 BONNAR, op. cit. supra note 95.
98 COPPENS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND MEDICAL
PRACTICE 59 (Spalding ed. 1921).
90 Can. 2350.
100 Can. 985,40
101 BONNAR, op. cit. supra note 95, at 83.
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will to eliminate the distinction between ani-
mated and non-animated fetus. ' 10 2 Today it
is contended that human life comes into
being at the moment of conception, regard-
less of the form of the embryo. It is usually
agreed that this occurs within a short time
after intercourse. o03
In judging the morality of abortions the
Catholic Church bases its position on an
analysis of human activity. A human act is
any act based on knowledge and will.'
Three elements are involved in judging the
morality of a human activity: the purpose
motivating it, its object, and the surround-
ing circumstances."' A person is not re-
sponsible for the evil effects of his actions
unless: (1) he realizes that the evil effect
might take place; (2) he is able to avoid the
action that might produce the evil effect,
and (3) he is aware of an obligation to re-
frain from so acting. If any one of these
elements is not present, the actor suffers no
guilt before God notwithstanding that the
evil effect results. 1°6
Since it is obvious that we are not obliged
to abstain from all actions that produce
harmful results, it is the second condition
that needs to be interpreted so as to develop
a practical rule. The application of the
"principle of double effect" provides a
means of determining permissible activity.
Since most significant human acts have both
good and evil effects it is often necessary to
L02 Huser, The Meaning of "Fetus" in Relation
To The Crime of Abortion, 8 JURIST 306, 319
(1948).
103 See CATHOLIC LAWYERS SOCIETY OF THE
ARCHDIOCESE OF DETROIT, CATHOLIC LAWYERS
GUIDE 38 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CATHOLIC
LAWYERS GUIDE].
104 Id. at 16.
105 Ibid.
106 KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS pt. 1, at 11
(1951).
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permit evil to occur. Action is permissible
provided four conditions are met: (1) that
the act itself is not morally wrong; (2) that
the evil is sincerely not desired and every
reasonable effort is made to avoid it; (3)
that the evil is not used as a means of ob-
taining a good end, and (4) that the good
effect is at least as important as the evil that
is tolerated. 10 7
In order to apply these principles, to the
problem of abortion, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish direct abortion from indirect abor-
tion. An abortion is direct "when the sole
immediate result of a procedure is the ter-
mination of pregnancy before viability;" it
is indirect when it is the "by-product of a
procedure which is immediately directed to
the cure of a pathological condition of the
mother."10
In order to be able to see clearly the areas
of conflict between current medical methods
and the teachings of the Church, several
hypothetical fact situations should be ana-
lyzed :10
(1) A woman with a heart disease has
faced increasing strain with each pregnancy.
This pregnancy, her third, has increased her
danger of dying during or immediately after
the pregnancy at least thirty times. Under
these facts, the abortion is legal, and most
doctors would abort the child; yet it is im-
moral because the conditions of the "prin-
ciple of double effect" have not been met.
(2) A pregnant woman has an existing
107 See id. at 12; CoPPENs, op. cit supra note 98,
at 67-68.
10 KELLY, op. cit. supra note 106, pt. 3, at 9.
109 These fact situations and the statements on
the opinions of doctors are based in part on a
study of medical practice in California. See
Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A
Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REV.
417 (1959).
neurosis which may be intensified by the
birth of another child. This added emotional
instability probably occurs in a substantial
number of all pregnancies. The abortion is
illegal, and most doctors would not abort
the child. It also is clearly immoral.
(3) A pregnancy results from rape. The
abortion is illegal, although most doctors
would approve it; it is also immoral. The
woman may attempt to eject the semen or
have it extracted provided this is done before
conception has taken place (within about
ten hours after the intercourse). This is
morally permissible because the semen is
present by unjust aggression and may there-
fore be expelled. 110
(4) A husband is ill and unable to work.
The wife supports him and their five chil-
dren, but has become pregnant again. To
operate would be illegal and most doctors
would not abort the child. An abortion on
this ground is also immoral, since the act
itself is morally wrong.
(5) A woman has cancer of the uterus. In
this case the abortion is legal, and all doc-
tors would abort the child. It may also be
moral, since the doctor, in order to remove
the malignancy, must run the risk of an
abortion. This case is clearly governed by
the "principle of double effect," since the
act has both a good and evil effect. The four
necessary conditions for the application of
the principle would be satisfied: the act of
operating to remove the cancer is obviously
morally permissible; the doctor would not
presumably intend the evil effect (abortion)
and would make every effort to avoid it; the
evil effect does not directly cause the good
(the preservation of life), and the preser-
110 BONNAR, op cit. supra note 95, at 88-89.
vation of the mother's life would be at least
as important as the evil effect which may
result.
One of the suggested reasons for liberal-
izing the present abortion laws is to bring
them into conformity with current medical
practice. These hypothetical fact situations
show that there is a high degree of correla-
tion between legal and medical attitudes.
Therefore, the validity of reforming the law
for this purpose would seem to be question-
able.
Abortion Legislation And The Catholic
Many commentators on the problem of
abortion manifest a lack of knowledge of the
nature of the position of the Catholic
Church. The Church's teachings on abortion
are based on a reasonable definition of law
and a logical, workable understanding of the
proper relationship of church and state.
Unless the non-Catholic, or for that matter
the Catholic, understands these beliefs a
solution to the problem of abortion legisla-
tion and the Catholic is impossible.
It is the position of the Catholic Church
that abortion contravenes both divine and
natural law. Furthermore, a statute legaliz-
ing abortion, even if only for the limited
purpose of saving the life of the mother, is
an abuse by the civil authorities of their
proper functions. The Catholic Church
teaches that God is the authority behind any
legitimate form of government and the au-
thor of both civil and religious authority.
The Church alone has authority over the
spiritual aspects of man's life and therefore
it is necessary for there to be civil freedom
for her to fulfill her mission. The state has
exclusive authority over purely secular mat-
ters. Therefore, the proper relationship be-
tween church and state should be one of
mutual respect and cooperation for the
10 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1964
benefit of the people. 11 1
The Catholic legislator may be brought
face to face with the abortion problem very
soon. It is reasonable to assume that bills
liberalizing the present abortion laws will be
presented to many legislatures in the near
future."' He will be asked for his opinion
on abortion, and be told that even if he
opposes it, he has no right to impose his
will on the majority and he should therefore
vote in favor of the bill. How should the
Catholic legislator respond? Certainly he is
to be guided by his conscience, but are his
critics correct? Is there a conflict between
his political duty and his religious beliefs?
Archbishop John Ireland, when asked this
question, responded:
My religious faith is that of the Catholic
Church - Catholicism, integral and unal-
loyed - Catholicism, unswerving and soul
swaying -the Catholicism, if I am to put
it into more positive and concrete form,
taught by the supreme chieftain of the
Catholic Church, the Bishop, the Pope of
Rome.
My civil and political faith is that of the
Republic of the United States of America-
Americanism, purest and brightest; yielding
in strength and loyalty to the Americanism
of none other American; surpassed in spirit
of obedience and sacrifice by that of none
other citizen, none other soldier; sworn to
uphold in peace and in war America's Star
Spangled Banner.
Between my religious faith and my civil and
political faith . . . it has been said, there is
discord and contradiction .... Those who
so speak misunderstand either my creed or
my country .... 113
'1' See CATHOLIC LAWYERS GUIDE 11-12 (1963).
12 See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 94, at 55.
113 Address by Most Rev. John Ireland, Aug. 11,
1913, in RYAN & BOLAND, CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICS 343 (1950).
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Today, many Catholic writers, in discuss-
ing the relationship between church and
state, suggest that the Church's "minimum
requirement, which may possibly be enough,
should be that on issues where agreement is
impossible, her members should not be
bound by the State to act in violation of their
consciences . 114
This position is premised on the belief
that the law has limited competency in creat-
ing a moral order. At most, the best the law
can do is attempt to preserve the existing
moral views.11 Whether one considers this
a depreciation of the force of law is almost
insignificant as society's diminishing accept-
ance of any absolutes has made it difficult
to communicate the efficiency of any law
which restricts private desires. Today, it
may well be true that "public enforcement
of religious standards cannot extend beyond
the area of community agreement.
116
This approach is not an abandonment of
principle to secularism; rather it is an ac-
ceptance of the moral pluralism which is
114 ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW
48 (1961). See generally MURRAY, WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS (1960) for the application of this
principle to several contemporary conflicts be-
tween church and state.
115 Id. at 40.
116 Id. at 45.
inherent in the religious pluralism of a free
society. It is a recognition of civil peace as a
moral value which may demand that the
conscientious objections of a minority not
be ignored. 1 17 But to allow the state to per-
mit the killing of innocent human beings
through abortion "strikes at the common
good so gravely that it endangers the fabric
of society and so should be suppressed by
law." 6
In theological terminology, to vote for the
liberalization of the present abortion laws
would be material cooperation, 19 and any-
one who cooperates in an abortion incurs a
canonical penalty."' Material cooperation
in a sin is licit when the action of the one
who cooperates is not evil and there is pro-
portionately a grave reason. 2 1 But as long
as the canonical limitation on cooperation
remains, it would seem that even if there
was a grave reason for so doing, a Catholic
legislator would be prohibited from voting
for a more liberal abortion law.
117 Id. at 47-48.
118 d. at 39.
119 CATHOLIC LAWYERS GUIDE 25 (1963). "Ma-
terial cooperation means that one, without giving
approval, aids another by an action which is not
in itself sinful." Id. at 24.
120 See Can. 985,40
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